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ABSTRACT
In recent years, a number of welfare reforms have been introduced 
in the UK by Conservative-led governments. The most high proile 
of these is Universal Credit (UC), which is currently being rolled 
out across the country. A key feature of UC is a change in the way 
the income-related housing allowance for social housing tenants 
(Housing Beneit) is administered, as under UC, it is paid directly to 
tenants (direct payment), who are responsible for paying their rent. 
This represents a step change for them as for more than 30 years 
landlord payment has been the norm in the UK. There has been little 
research into direct payment. This paper seeks to address this gap in 
knowledge by presenting the key indings of an initiative designed to 
trial direct payment. It inds that many tenants experienced di culties 
on direct payment. Relecting this, landlords' arrears rose markedly.
1. Introduction
In most Western European countries, the most common way of administering income-re-
lated housing allowances has been to pay them directly to tenants. In efect, the same is 
also true in countries such as Germany and Sweden where social assistance recipients are 
not eligible for the housing allowance scheme, but instead receive help with their housing 
costs via an addition to their social assistance beneit.
However, in the UK – where the housing allowance scheme is called Housing Beneit 
(HB) – for the past three decades, payment to the landlord has been the norm for tenants 
living in social housing. Indeed, during this period, it has been a taken-for-granted assump-
tion amongst landlords, tenants and scheme administrators that HB should be paid to social 
housing landlords and not to their tenants.
Nevertheless, in 2010, the newly elected Coalition Government in the UK announced a 
major reform of the beneits system (discussed below), one element of which was that, for 
social housing tenants, HB would be paid directly to them (‘direct payment’) and not to their 
landlord. he proposal to pay HB direct was highly controversial and widely condemned. 
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Critics argued that it would inevitably result in increased rent arrears because many recip-
ients would spend the money on things other than their rent. hese tenants were seen as 
being too inancially vulnerable (or alternatively, too irresponsible) to have their HB paid 
directly to them.
For both landlords and tenants, the shit to direct payment (DP) of HB represents a major 
change. For tenants, this is because many will have had no recent experience of paying 
their rent and some – for example, disabled people and the long-term unemployed – may 
have no experience whatsoever. For landlords, DP represents a challenge to their income 
streams. Under landlord payment, income from HB is guaranteed, which in turn is oten 
relected in their inancial agreements with lenders, who have a degree of assurance about 
landlords’ ability to service their loans. Under DP this will not be the case.
his paper assesses the impact of this change, drawing on data collected from the ‘oicial’ 
evaluation of a pilot programme designed to trial DP: the Direct Payment Demonstration 
Projects (DPDP). In doing so, it seeks to contribute to knowledge in what is a relatively 
under-researched area. here is a large international literature on income-related housing 
allowances and, in the UK context, a growing literature on HB and the impact of welfare 
reforms. However, there has been very little research into the administration of housing 
allowances and speciically the impact of paying them directly to tenants.
he paper seeks to provide answers to the following research questions: how do tenants 
manage on DP and what is their experience of it? Do rent arrears increase under DP, as its 
critics argue? Do some groups of tenants ind it more diicult to manage on DP than others? 
Do tenants’ approaches to money management afect their ability to manage on DP? Does 
DP make tenants more ‘responsible’, as advocates of the approach have argued? Finally, what 
is the overall impact of DP on social housing tenants and landlords?
he paper is divided into nine sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the HB and 
welfare reforms undertaken in the UK, while the following section explores the rationale 
behind them. Section 4 forms a literature review. Section 5 outlines the approach to the 
research. he subsequent three sections highlight the study’s principal indings: the impact 
of DP on tenants (Section 6) and landlords (Section 7), and how the indings played out by 
project area (Section 8). Section 9 highlights the paper’s contribution to knowledge.
2. HB and welfare reform
HB is a means-tested housing allowance that is paid to low-income social and private 
tenants to help them aford their rent. he scheme was introduced in 1982/1983 through 
the Social Security and Housing Beneit Act 1982 and replaced two diferent systems of 
income-related housing support (see Kemp, 2007, for details). HB is administered by local 
authorities under statutory regulations supplemented by guidance from the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP), the current name for the social security ministry in the UK.
About 6 out of 10 social housing tenants and 1 in 4 private tenants in the UK are currently 
in receipt of HB. he total number of recipients has risen since the global inancial crisis, 
from 4.03 million in 2007 to 4.98 million in 2014, an increase of 24 per cent in just six years. 
Most of that growth in the HB caseload is accounted for by a very sharp rise in the number 
of claimants who are in low-paid work. he share of claimants in paid work has more than 
doubled and is now nearly a quarter of the total (HB caseload statistics at www.gov.uk).
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Unlike other Western European countries, the UK HB scheme has more of an income 
support function than a housing inance one (Kemp, 2007); it aims to ensure that net 
incomes ater housing costs do not fall below the social assistance beneit level. Hence, 
many claimants who are in receipt of social assistance beneits have all of their rent covered 
by HB (oten referred to as ‘full HB’). In these cases, therefore, social housing tenants do 
not themselves pay their landlord any rent: the HB is sent to the landlord on their behalf 
and the tenant has nothing to pay. Where HB covers only part of the rent (‘partial HB’), 
it is sent to the landlord and the tenant has to pay the amount of rent not covered by HB.
2.1. Welfare reform
In July 2010, the newly elected centre-right Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government published a consultation document setting out proposals for a major reform 
of the beneits system (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010a). he existing system 
was perceived to be too complex and created disincentives for working-age claimants to 
move into paid work. he result, it was argued, had been rising costs of welfare support 
and persistent ‘welfare dependency’ (Ferrari, 2015). he principles and proposals set out in 
the consultation paper were detailed further in the White Paper, Universal Credit: Welfare 
that Works (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010b), and enshrined in law when the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012) received royal assent 
in March 2012.
he lagship feature of the Coalition Government’s proposed reform was the merger of 
six existing out-of-work beneits for people of working age: Jobseeker’s Allowance: Working 
Tax Credit; Child Tax Credit; income-based Employment and Support Allowance; Income 
Support; and HB. he new integrated beneit to replace these six beneits was called Universal 
Credit (UC). herefore, instead of being a separate beneit, HB was to be incorporated into, 
and paid, as part of the new UC. In other words, instead of being paid to the landlord, HB 
(the housing component of UC) would henceforth be paid directly to the tenant. his meant 
that recipients would be responsible for paying all of the rent to their landlord.
he way in which HB for social housing tenants was to be calculated in UC was, with two 
very important exceptions, the same as for existing HB scheme. he two exceptions were 
themselves highly controversial features of the Coalition government’s package of welfare 
reforms. he irst involved the introduction of very tight accommodation size criteria that 
matched those that already existed for private tenants in receipt of HB. Under this reform, 
social housing tenants who were deemed to be under-occupying their home were penalised 
with a reduction in their HB: by 14 per cent for claimants with one ‘spare’ bedroom and 
by 25 per cent for those with two spare bedrooms. Critics of this cut referred to it as the 
‘bedroom tax’, a term that was widely used in the media to describe the reform, though the 
government referred to it as the Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy. he second change 
was the introduction of the Beneit Cap in which a limit was placed on the total amount 
of welfare beneit that could be paid to claimants per year. Where claimants were afected 
by the new Beneit Cap, the excess amount above the limit was to be deducted in the irst 
instance from their HB.
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2.2. The direct payment demonstration projects
he proposal to shit from landlord payment to DP was almost universally criticised. It was 
not just landlords and landlord organisations that criticised the reform, but also groups 
representing tenants and disadvantaged people. he idea that claimants should be given 
responsibility for managing their HB and paying their (full) rent was seen as almost incom-
prehensible. It was claimed that claimants on DP would inevitably spend the money on 
other things and hence fall into rent arrears (discussed in Irvine et al., 2007).
However, the government was able to point to a reform of HB for private tenants that 
had been successfully introduced nationwide in 2008 following a two-year pilot in 18 local 
authority areas. he main feature of this reform was a change in the way HB entitlement 
was calculated, which was referred to as the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) as it was 
based on average rent levels in the local market area. One additional feature of this reform 
was that HB was to be paid to the tenant and not the landlord. An exception was made for 
claimants who were deemed to be ‘vulnerable’, unlikely to pay their rent or at least 8 weeks 
behind with the rent.
he ‘oicial’, independent evaluation of the LHA pilot conducted in 9 of the 18 local 
authority areas found that the proportion of claimants whose HB was paid direct to the 
tenant increased from 1 in 2 to 9 out of 10. Moreover, this marked increased in DP had not 
resulted in a signiicant rise in rent arrears. he evaluation team concluded that, 15 months 
ater the reform in the pilot areas, rent arrears was not a problem afecting HB claimants 
or their landlords (Walker, 2005). hus, despite the fears expressed by private landlords, 
mortgage lenders and consumer groups, the great majority of private tenants in receipt of 
DPs were successfully managing their HB and paying their rent (Kemp, 2007).
However, the proportion of HB claimants whose rent was being paid direct to their 
landlord was much lower for private tenants before the LHA pilot (60 per cent) than it was 
for social housing tenants prior to the UC reform. Indeed, all HB claimants renting from 
local authorities were on the landlord system, as were 92 per cent of housing association 
tenants on HB (Irvine et al., 2007). hus, far more social housing HB claimants would be 
afected by the switch to DPs than had been the case for private tenants when the LHA 
was introduced. Moreover, critics also pointed out that far more social housing tenants 
are vulnerable – and therefore likely to have diiculty paying their rent – than is the case 
for private tenants. Indeed, the reason why they had been accepted for social housing was 
precisely because they were in some way vulnerable.
In response to critics, the government announced in September 2011 that the DP of HB 
for social housing tenants would be tested in six DPDPs. hey were to be evaluated by an 
independent research team, with the indings informing the development of the housing 
component of the new UC prior to its introduction. Social housing landlords were invited to 
take part in the programme. he six successful projects were Oxford, Shropshire, Southwark, 
Torfaen, Wakeield and Edinburgh.
hese areas were selected because they are very diferent in terms of their characteris-
tics – the UK government wanted to ensure that the areas selected represented a range of 
social housing landlord types with representation from England, Scotland and Wales. It is 
important to acknowledge, here, that the socio-political, legal, cultural and housing policy 
and practice contexts in three territories difer markedly.
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In line with the approach taken to UC, tenants under the DPDP programme experienced 
two changes to how their HB was administered: (1) HB would be paid directly to them; and 
(2) they would receive it every four weeks, broadly in line with monthly payments under UC, 
instead of weekly or fortnightly as was previously the case. As with UC, only working-age 
claimants would be eligible for DP. hose tenants who encountered diiculties with DP and 
fell into arrears would be switched back to landlord payment. he projects went live in June 
2012, with the roll-out of the programme being completed in March 2013, by which time 
7004 tenants had gone onto DP. he DPDPs ended in December 2013.
he roll-out of the new UC programme began on a very small scale in 2013. It was 
piloted in only four locations across England; was conined to new claimants only; and 
did not include claimants with dependent children. he roll-out of the programme has 
not progressed at the speed that the government had anticipated. When it went live, it was 
anticipated that it would be completed by 2017, but by July 2016 only 280,000 claimants 
were receiving UC. At that point, the UK government announced that the roll-out would 
not be completed until 2022 (Butler & Walker, 2016).
3. Understanding beneit and welfare reforms in the UK
he introduction of UC (incorporating DP of HB) and the other changes highlighted above 
are part of a broader suite of welfare reforms that have been introduced in the UK. heir 
introduction is consistent with neoliberal thinking, a philosophy which became increasingly 
popular with Western governments from the late twentieth century (Stonehouse, 2015).
here is a large literature on conceptualising and understanding neoliberalism. However, 
it has (legitimately) been problematised for being imprecise and for over-reaching itself; 
for misusing the term ‘neoliberal’; and, for providing an over-simpliied and (sometimes) 
biased interpretation of the behaviour of the state (Storper, 2016). Notwithstanding this, 
and accepting that the term is, to some degree, contested, there is widespread agreement 
that neoliberalism has three key features: extending market relationships and reducing state 
intervention; welfare state roll-back; and, an emphasis on the responsibilities of citizens to 
maximise their opportunities within markets, thereby reducing the level of risk to the state, 
a concept which is known as ‘responsibilisation’ (Peck & heodore, 2012; Stonehouse, 2015; 
Trnka & Trundle, 2014). DP is a prime example of responsibilisation policy in practice.
he hegemony of neoliberalism has seen the emergence of a new welfare paradigm in 
many countries across the world including the UK: the new welfare state model (Peeters, 
2013). he approach, which has become increasingly prevalent over the last two decades and 
which was given momentum by the 2007–2009 inancial crisis (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2015), 
emphasises the responsibility of citizens to prevent social risk (Peeters, 2013), while at the 
same time reasserting one of the key tenets of neoliberalism: state withdrawal. he model 
has taken diferent forms in diferent countries and Taylor-Gooby et al. (2015) have devised 
a typology of approaches. In the UK, they argue, a ‘liberal’ approach has been employed, 
which is characterised by initiatives to make work pay and incentivise people into work, 
with UC being highlighted as one such initiative.
he model places particular emphasis on responsibilisation (Peeters, 2013). To some 
extent, responsibilisation is a fuzzy concept: it has taken on many meanings and, to an 
extent, has been ‘colonised’ (Trnka & Trundle, 2014; Lemke, 2001). Furthermore, its form 
may vary (Stonehouse, 2015). However, there is agreement that at its heart lies the notion 
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of emphasising the role of citizens as agents while down-playing the role of structure (the 
state), an emphasis that has been criticised within Foucouldian critiques of neoliberalism 
(Stonehouse, 2015)
In the UK, the notion of responsibilisation has gained considerable traction and has 
driven housing and welfare policy since the turn of the century; and particularly since 
2010 when the Conservative-Liberal Coalition came to power and subsequently under 
the 2015 Conservative Government. However, in the context of social housing in the UK, 
the notion of citizens having responsibilities is nothing new. Indeed, in the late nineteenth 
century, the social reformer Octavia Hill was very clear about the responsibilities of tenants 
(Haworth & Manzi, 1999). he notion of responsibilisation began to gain traction under 
the New Labour governments of the 2000s. Informed by the work of David Garland (see 
Garland, 2001), they introduced a number of initiatives designed to increase the ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ of welfare recipients.
he introduction of DP should be seen in this light. It was not introduced because there 
was compelling evidence demanding its implementation. Indeed, the evidence base on 
the issue is relatively small and under-developed, as will be explored later in this paper. 
DP was introduced because it was seen as a better way of delivering HB and, crucially, by 
responsibilising tenants, would secure behaviour change amongst them. Speciically, it was 
believed that its introduction would help tenants to become more efective money managers 
and thereby be better able and more incentivised to ind paid work (IPPR, 2010; Keohane 
& Shorthouse, 2012). And it was the latter that appears to be the principal rational behind 
the introduction of DP.
he desire to secure behaviour change is another hallmark of neoliberal thinking, the 
new welfare state and, importantly, responsibilisation – directed by the government (Peeters, 
2013), citizens should be nudged and incentivised to behave in certain ways. his has been 
the approach of recent UK governments who have embraced behavioural economics and 
concepts like nudging, incentivising and MINDSPACE, an approach to inluencing behav-
iour change through public policy. In 2011, the Cabinet Oice produced a good practice 
guide on how to implement MINDSPACE to facilitate behaviour change (Cabinet Oice 
and the Institute of Government, 2011).
4. Literature review
here are a number of literatures that are relevant to the focus of this paper, although as will 
be explored below, they shed very little light on the impact of administering HB directly. 
First, there is a growing literature on responsibilisation and it has been researched in a 
number of contexts including: education (Peters, 2001); crime (Barry, 2013; Bennett, 2008; 
Kemshall, 2002), poverty (Dean, 1992), unemployment (Wiggan, 2012), health (Beckmann, 
2013; Greco, 1993) and homelessness (Dobson & McNeill, 2011). Of most relevance to this 
paper is the work of Flint (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2006) who explored responsibilisation in 
the context of social housing, and the regulation and management of anti-social behaviour 
speciically. He argued that, while the focus on responsibilisation in this context was not 
new, its nature and scope has been broadened (Flint, 2004b).
Second, there is an international literature on income-related housing allowances in the 
context of social housing. Studies in this area have focused on a number of issues including 
comparing national systems (Agiro & Matusitz, 2011; Kemp, 1990, 2007) and eligibility, 
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degree of choice, incentive mechanisms and ‘extent of oversight’ (Priemus et al., 2005). 
However, the issue of how subsidies are administered, speciically whether they are paid to 
tenants (DP) or to landlords (landlord payment), and the consequences of adopting these 
payment approaches have received very little attention.
hird, in a UK context, there is a literature on HB, which has examined a number of 
issues including: the eicacy of the HB system as a whole (Kemp, 1998, 2000; Kemp et al., 
2002; King, 1999; Stephens, 2005); comparing systems (Kemp, 2000; Priemus & Kemp, 
2004); the impact of changes to the system (Gibbons & Manning, 2006; Fenton, 2011); and 
its cost (Johnson, 2015; Phillips, 2013; Wilcox & Perry, 2014).
he reconiguration of the HB system for private renters with the introduction of LHA 
in 2008 renewed interest in HB amongst academics. here have been numerous studies on 
LHA, many of which have been produced by members of the study team responsible for 
undertaking the national evaluation of the programme (Beatty et al., 2012; Beatty et al., 
2014a, 2014b, 2014c). While a key element of LHA is DP, the outputs from the national 
evaluation of the programme are relatively silent on its impact as the study team was not 
tasked with exploring the issue. And taken as a whole, the UK literature on HB provides 
very little insight into DP.
Fourth, there is a growing literature on the impact of welfare reforms. here have been 
studies into: the ‘bedroom tax’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015); the impact of 
the introduction of a cap on beneits (Clarke, 2014); the likely impact of removing the auto-
matic entitlement to the HB element of UC from some new 18–21 year-old claimants from 
April 2017 onwards (Cole et al., 2015); and the overall inancial impact of welfare reforms 
(Beatty & Fothergill, 2016; Beatty & Fothergill, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; NHF, 2012, 2014).
here has been very little robust research into the government’s key welfare reform, UC. 
his is primarily because, unlike the case for the DPDP and ‘bedroom tax’ initiatives, the 
government decided not to commission an independent evaluation of UC. And there has 
only been one comprehensive study of the impact of DP: the national evaluation of the 
DPDPs (Hickman et al., 2014), data from which are explored in this paper. However, three 
publications do shed some light on the issue, albeit in a limited way: Donaldson (2004); 
Irvine et al. (2007); and Green et al. (2015).
In a one-page article in a housing trade journal, Donaldson (2004) presents the head-
line indings from a trial of DP that was undertaken on one housing estate by the housing 
association, London and Quadrant Housing Trust in 2002. he Trust included 800 tenants 
in a pilot testing out two approaches to DP that lasted for a year. One of the key indings of 
the pilot, which were never formally published, was that arrears increased from 3 per cent 
to 7 per cent over the course the programme, peaking at 9 per cent (Donaldson, 2004). he 
pilot also found that there were additional transactional costs associated with DP, which 
amounted to approximately £300,000, with further costs accruing as a result of ‘additional 
staf time [incurred] pursuing individual residents for their arrears’ (Donaldson, 2004, p. 21).
Green et al. (2015) explored the likely impact of DP. hey examined social housing 
landlords’ preparation for UC, a key element of which, as noted earlier, is DP. hey found 
that landlords believed the introduction of UC would result in: an increase in arrears (98 
per cent thought that this would be the case); a change in the relationship between landlord 
and tenant (96 per cent); more resources being devoted to rent collection and rent recovery 
(95 per cent); and more staf being employed (75 per cent).
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Irvine et al. (2007) conducted a qualitative study with 82 HB claimants renting from 
private or social housing landlords in three local authority areas in England. Fity-eight 
tenants were on landlord payment and 24 on tenant payment. he aim was to explore the 
views and experiences of claimants to landlord payment and DP of HB. It also examined 
their attitudes towards their liability to pay the rent; how rent payment itted into their 
household budgeting methods; and how claimants on landlord payment thought they would 
manage if DP was to be introduced.
Irvine et al. (2007, p. 10) found that, while most of the participants had a preference 
for landlord payment, many did not think it would be particularly diicult to adjust to 
tenant payment. hey also found that most tenants prioritised paying their rent over other 
household bills. Relecting on their indings, they concluded that: ‘many did not think 
that it would be particularly diicult to adjust to receiving HB and paying full rent to their 
landlord’ (Irvine et al., 2007, p. 4).
When the DPDP programme was conceived, there was a belief within government that 
some population groups would fare better on DP than others. Irvine et al. (2007) reported 
that some tenants who did not prioritise their rent would be more likely to fall into arrears on 
DP. Speciically, they identiied two types of tenants whose approach to money management 
suggested they were more likely, or who said they were more likely, to get into rent arrears 
if DP was to be introduced: (1) ‘chaotic’ money managers, who were ‘found only among 
young people and lone parents … and had diicult inancial situations and many of them 
said they could be forgetful about paying bills and/or were generally careless with money’; 
and (2) ‘lexible’ money managers, who ‘were less rigid than ‘ordered’ money managers (who 
preferred payment methods that they felt provided control over when and how much they 
paid, such as cash, cheques, and internet banking’).
If one supports the intuitively plausible hypothesis that some types of money management 
behaviour are less conducive to coping with DP than others, then it is necessary to review 
the broader literature on inancial capability. At its broadest level, inancial capability is:
the internal capacity to act in one’s best inancial interest given socioeconomic environmental 
conditions. It therefore encompasses the knowledge, attitudes, skills and behaviors of consum-
ers with regard to managing their resources and understanding, selecting and making use of 
inancial services that it their needs. (World Bank, 2013, p. 7)
Further insight into the concept is provided by McQuaid & Edgell (2010) who identify the 
key characteristics of a inancially capable person. hey argue that he/she is someone who 
can deal efectively and conidently with: the day-to-day management of inances; planning 
ahead (for speciic issues such as retirement or unexpected events); selecting inancial prod-
ucts and understanding these products; and/or knowing where, and how, to seek inancial 
advice (McQuaid & Egdell, 2010). Furthermore, he/she is someone who is also motivated 
to manage their inances and efect change, where necessary (op.cit).
he literature on inancial capability has grown in recent years (Gilbertson, 2014). It has 
focused, principally, on two issues: measuring and assessing inancial capability – see for 
example, he Money Advice Service (2015); and highlighting ways that it can be improved 
and developed. Some of the publications that have been concerned with the latter advo-
cate the use of behavioural economics and draw on techniques and frameworks to secure 
behavioural change, including the MINDSPACE framework (de Meza et al., 2008; Elliott 
et al., 2010).
HOUSING STUDIES  9
he literature on inancial capability reveals that, as one might expect, some population 
groups are less capable. hese include young adults, particularly those aged 18–24 (Money 
Advice Service, 2015). Interestingly, with the impact of DP in mind, the same study also 
highlighted another group that was less inancially capable: ‘recipients of beneits being 
replaced by UC, in particular unemployed people’ (Money Advice Service, 2015, p. 5).
It is important, here, to make one inal point on the inancial capability literature: it is 
relatively under-developed in terms of the impact of initiatives designed to secure behav-
iour change (Gilbertson, 2014). However, three studies do shed some light on the issue 
(Consumer Financial Education Body, 2010; Elliott et al., 2010; Taylor, 2011). he Elliott et 
al. study is of particular relevance to this paper as it used the MINDSPACE framework to 
explore the behaviour of users of a number of inancial products informed and underpinned 
by the principles of behavioural economics. Two of them – a ‘prepaid current account’ 
and a ‘money management tool’ – were found to have resulted in a change in participants’ 
inancial behaviour.
5. Methods
he study employed a mixed methods approach that involved four principal elements: 
tenant surveys; analysis of rent accounts; qualitative work with tenants; and qualitative 
work with stakeholders.
hree ‘longitudinal’ household surveys were undertaken as part of the study. he irst of 
these was a stage 1 (or ‘baseline’) survey which involved 1965 tenants being interviewed in 
the six project areas between May and July 2012. he stage 2 survey involved 1227 of these 
tenants being re-interviewed between June and November 2013 along with 617 new top-up 
interviews. he stage 3 (and inal) survey took place early in 2014 and involved 650 tenants, 
of whom 459 had participated in the stage 1 and 2 surveys. A small-scale telephone survey 
of 95 tenants who had underpaid their rent was also conducted in the autumn of 2013.
Analysis of the rent accounts of all tenants who went onto DP in the DPDP programme 
and of a comparator sample was carried out at two points in time – 12 months into the 
programme and at its conclusion. Tenants in the DPDP programme with no experience 
of DP were not included in the analysis. he DP sample included tenants for whom the 
projects provided both rent account and HB data in at least one rent account period and 
for whom there was some activity on their rent account.
In total, 7252 tenants were identiied as having been paid their HB direct. hey were 
compared with a comparator sample comprising 4941 tenants. Propensity score matching 
was used to ensure that the samples were as similar as possible. he following variables 
were used to match tenants in the two samples: rent account balance; proportion of rent 
covered by HB; rent level; age; household size/composition; work status; property size; and 
HB receipt and duration of entitlement.
he qualitative work involved 180 in-depth interviews with tenants over the course of 
the study, many of which were undertaken with members of a tenant panel. In addition, 
125 interviews were conducted with national and local stakeholders in the DPDP.
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6. Impact of DP on tenants
6.1. Experience of being on DP
Critics of UC argued that tenants would struggle with DP of HB. However, as noted earlier, 
in a qualitative study of tenants on HB conducted before the UC reform was announced, 
Irvine et al. (2007) found that most respondents thought they would be able to cope with 
DP, if it was to be introduced. his issue was therefore explored in the DPDP evaluation.
When asked how well or poorly they were coping with DP of their HB, the great majority 
of tenants on DP in the stage 2 survey reported that they were coping well: 41 per cent ‘very 
well’ and 33 per cent ‘fairly well’. Meanwhile, 16 per cent said they were coping ‘poorly’ (Table 
1). Moreover, when asked in the stage 3 survey how easy or diicult it was to manage their 
inances now that HB was being paid direct to them, three-quarters of tenants reported 
that it was either ‘very easy’ (39 per cent) or ‘fairly easy’ (34 per cent). Only a minority (15 
per cent) reported that it was diicult to manage (Kemp, 2014).
Not surprisingly, tenants who had been on DP but had switched back to landlord pay-
ment (ex-participants) had more negative perceptions than those who remained on DP 
(current participants). Current and ex-participants were asked whether, taking everything 
into account, they managed better, worse or about the same as they originally expected, while 
HB was being paid directly to them. A higher proportion of current participants reported 
that they had managed about the same as expected than was the case for ex-participants. 
Indeed, compared with current participants, ex-participants were more than twice as likely 
to say they had managed worse than they expected (Table 2).
Furthermore, many tenants found DP stressful and a source of anxiety. he telephone 
survey of under-payers found that, when asked why they wanted to leave the DPDP pro-
gramme, 34 per cent of respondents (or 25 out of 73) reported that it was ‘too stressful’.
Table 1.  How well or poorly were current participants coping with direct payments of HB? (stage 2 
 survey).
note: excludes 4 tenants who did not know.
source: stage 2 survey.
Current participants (%)
Very well 41
Fairly well 33
neither well nor poorly 10
Fairly poorly 9
Very poorly 7
Base: current participants 968
Table 2. Have tenants managed direct payments of HB better or worse than they originally expected? – 
By dPdP status (stage 2 survey).
note: excludes 10 tenants who did not know.
statistical signiicance ***p < 0.001.
source: stage 2 survey.
*** Current participants (%) Ex-participants (%) All participants (%)
Better than expected 19 5 15
About the same 59 42 55
Worse than expected 22 53 30
Base: current and ex-participants 958 298 1256
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A number of tenants who were interviewed in-depth highlighted how stressful they 
found DP, particularly when transitioning from landlord payment. he experience of one 
tenant was typical of many:
It [DP] did make me worry and panic … cos obviously I’m ringing them [landlord] saying: 
‘this is what I’ve been paid, is it right?’ And they’re: ‘well if that’s what’s been paid’. And I’m: 
‘no, I want to make sure it’s right. I don’t want you sending me a letter saying you owe us £15 
from last week, 13 from the week before’. And then it all mounts up and you’ve got loads of 
rent arrears and I don’t want that.
he diiculty many tenants had with DP is relected in the higher levels of arrears associated 
with it, a inding which is explored in Section 7. And only 8 per cent of tenants managed 
to pay all of their rent in full over the duration of the programme.
here were a number of negative consequences associated with falling into arrears. hese 
included: accrual of bank charges; the ‘embarrassment’ and ‘shame’ of being in arrears; and the 
di culty of repaying arrears – many tenants reported that they had to ‘go without’ to do so.
6.2. The characteristics of tenants who fell into arrears
Logistical regression analysis was carried out using data from the stage 3 survey to exam-
ine the characteristics of tenants whose rent arrears had either occurred or increased ater 
they went on the DPDP (‘new arrears’). Gender, age group, ethnicity, household type and 
disability were included as controls in all models. None was statistically signiicant. he 
results of the best-itting model are shown in Table 3. he most important inding was that 
being on DP was not statistically signiicant.
In other words, other things being equal, tenants on DP of HB were neither more nor 
less likely to be in new arrears than those who were on landlord payment. his contrasts 
with the results of the rent account analysis (see section 7), which found that moving onto 
direct payment was associated with an increase in rent arrears. However, the logistic regres-
sion result is not necessarily surprising: it was precisely because they were in arrears that 
many ex-participants had been switched back to landlord payment. Instead, the incidence 
of new arrears amongst tenants was signiicantly associated with ive variables: (1) having 
a compulsory deduction from earnings or social security beneits in order to repay debts 
(typically utility payments or rent arrears); (2) being behind on one or more ‘household 
bills’; (3) having an HB entitlement that was less than the full amount of the rent; (4) having 
Table 3. Logistic regression odds of being in ‘new’ rent arrears at the stage 3 survey.
notes: statistical signiicance: **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
non-signiicant variables included in the model = gender, age group, ethnicity, household type and disability.
‘new arrears’ = arrears that had occurred, or increased, after the tenant went onto the dPdP.
source: stage 3 survey.
Column percentages
New arrears at stage 3
Sig. Odds
Welfare reform beneit reduction* .014 2.0
Behind on 1+ household bills** .002 2.1
Automatic deductions from earnings or beneits** .001 2.3
Would use HB if had a bill that was di cult to pay** .006 2.1
HB covers only part of the rent* .011 1.9
Base: all tenants 632
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had a cut in HB due to either the ‘bedroom tax’ or the total ‘beneit cap’ (or both); and (5) 
tenants who said they would use their HB money to pay for an unexpected expense or large 
bill that was diicult to pay.
he key message to emerge from the analysis, therefore, is that it was tenants’ inancial 
circumstances that determined whether they got into new arrears during the DPDP. New 
arrears were not correlated with whether or not the tenant was on DP of HB. Instead, it 
was related to tenants’ inancial vulnerability, as relected in the indicators of indebtedness 
shown in Table 3, and whether or not they had experienced a negative income shock due 
to either the ‘bedroom tax’ or the total ‘beneit cap’.
6.3. Why tenants fell into arrears
he importance of the inancial circumstances of tenants in terms of determining how they 
fared on DP is reinforced by other data collected in the stage 3 survey. Respondents to the 
survey who were behind with their rent at the end of the DPDP were asked to cite the single 
most important reason for their arrears. he three most commonly cited were all related 
to their inancial circumstances: loss of income due to the ‘bedroom tax’ (10 per cent); low 
income (10 per cent); and unexpected expenses (8 per cent).
Tenants who were underpaying (or not paying) the rent could be categorised into three 
groups: strategic, intentional under-payers; accidental under-payers; and ‘trigger’-prompted 
under-payers. When the DPDP programme was conceived, there was concern from the 
UK government that some tenants would underpay (or not pay) their rent as part of delib-
erate strategy to be taken of DP, to secure some additional income for themselves or as 
an ‘interest free loan’, i.e. to purchase ‘luxury’ items they could not otherwise aford. here 
were tenants in the DPDPs who had done this but they were very much in the minority, 
with the strategic under-payers group having very few members.
Accidental under-payers was a relatively large group and included those tenants who 
miscalculated their inances (sometimes through poor inancial management but oten 
despite good money management skills), were unclear about the mechanics of DP, HB, 
rent payments, Direct Debits and Discretionary Housing Payment (a payment designed 
to alleviate the impact of the ‘bedroom tax’), or who fell foul of administrative errors that 
impacted on their income or outgoings.
For ‘trigger’-prompted under-payers, who represented the largest group, under/non- 
payment was prompted by an ‘unexpected expense’ (to use the language of the stage 3 
survey) or ‘trigger’. hese triggers could be a day-to-day issue, such as running out of food 
or money for gas and electricity meters; or a life event, such as a relationship breakdown 
or bereavement. hese triggers afected tenants in two ways: emotionally, making it more 
diicult for them to manage their lives generally; and inancially, by putting a strain on their 
budgets. One tenant panel member, for example, used some of her HB to pay for food and 
electricity and the cost of her mother’s funeral.
In a similar vein, one tenant panel member used some of her HB monies to cover the 
transport costs of visiting her sick mother in hospital, and another used it to cover the cost 
of visiting his ill mother in Belfast. hese tenants were fully aware that they were using 
their HB to pay for something other than rent. In that sense, their under-payment was 
intentional and could be seen as a means of securing an ‘interest-free loan’. But they did 
not see it in that way, as a calculated way to secure extra money or ‘beat the system’. Rather, 
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they were making diicult inancial decisions in the face of unexpected circumstances and 
low incomes.
Analysis of rent account data highlights the prevalence of trigger-prompted under- 
payment/non-payment: 65 per cent of tenants could be described as having exhibited erratic 
payment patterns, including 17 per cent of tenants who failed to pay all their rent just once, 
22 per cent who did so infrequently and 26 per cent who did so frequently but erratically.
6.4. Behaviour change
As noted earlier, one of the rationales behind the introduction of DP through DPDP (and 
ultimately UC) was that it would result in a number of positive behavioural changes, includ-
ing tenants becoming better money managers and more motivated to ind work.
Behavioural change was found to be a slow process with there being little percepti-
ble change in the irst year of the DPDP programme. However, as it continued, small, 
but important changes in tenants’ attitudes, behaviours and money management skills 
started to emerge. here was evidence that some tenants had been incentivised to look 
for work as a result of DP; that participation in the programme had made tenants more 
aware of the rent they paid; and had made them better at, and more conident about, 
managing their money. In addition, there was an increase in tenants using Direct Debit 
to pay their rent.
Forty-one per cent of stage 3 participants agreed that taking part in the DPDP had made 
them better at managing their money (45 per cent disagreed). A number reported that this 
was because they were more aware of their inances:
I can’t miss a week. Before, I were a bit more lenient with myself and it might be a monthly thing 
that I used to do with my inances, writing it all down and planning it all out. Yeah, it’s [DP] 
made me more aware that I need to check it all time and I need to be on top of it all … Yeah, 
I do manage a lot easier now.
Forty-two per cent of stage 3 participants agreed that taking part in the DPDP had made 
them more conident at managing their money (42 per cent disagreed). Interestingly, in 
the light of the agenda that lies at the heart of DP – responsibilisation – a small number 
of claimants acknowledged they had taken on more responsibility, something which they 
appeared to value:
And now it’s not just the little things I’m keeping an eye on, it’s big things. So it makes me feel 
I’ve got a lot more responsibility. And it’s nice to do my in-goings and out-goings but on a 
bigger scale of how much it would be.
Participation in the DPDP programme appeared to have made tenants more aware of their 
rent: 54 per cent of stage 3 participants agreed that taking part in the programme had made 
them more interested in how much rent they were being charged for their accommodation 
(31 per cent disagreed). However, this heightened awareness did not manifest itself in a 
more positive relationship between tenant and landlord. More than three-quarters (77 per 
cent) of respondents to the stage 3 survey reported that their experience of the DPDP had 
made no diference to how they felt about their landlord, with only 7 per cent reporting 
that it had done so in a positive way.
here is evidence to suggest that being on DP did incentivise some tenants to look for 
work. First, the stage 3 survey found that 38 per cent of respondents agreed that their 
participation in the DPDP trial had made them more likely to look for a job (50 per cent 
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disagreed). It also found that 35 per cent of participants agreed that taking part in the 
programme had made them more likely to hold down a job (52 per cent disagreed). And 
22 per cent agreed with the statement that taking part in it had made them increase their 
hours of work (67 per cent disagreed).
Second, rent account data also suggested that being on DP had a positive impact on tenants’ 
willingness to look for work: analysis undertaken at the end of the programme revealed that 
DP was associated with a greater likelihood of entering employment. Using proxy indicators 
(Single Housing Beneit Extract data relating to work/economic status and reasons for the 
end of a claim), the proportion of DPDP tenants in work increased from 21 to 23 per cent, 
while the proportion of comparator sample tenants in work remained static at 21 per cent 
(this diference in change was statistically signiicant at the 0.05 level). his evidence should 
be treated with some caution because it was not possible (due to limitations with the data) 
to establish whether this increase could be speciically attributed to tenants being on DP.
Qualitative data collected by the study team helped explain these indings and shed some 
light on how and why DP was helping tenants to ind work. A number of tenants reported 
that it was their enhanced awareness of their inancial circumstances that made them better 
placed to ind work:
So now, when I’m looking for work, I feel a bit more comfortable cos I know exactly how much 
I’ll need to pay. And it doesn’t seem such an enormous number. I didn’t have a clue before, so 
it has made a huge diference.
It is important to make one inal point on the issue of behaviour change: the extent to 
which DP could change tenants’ behaviour was checked by the preference of both tenants 
and landlords for synchronised HB and rent payments, where monies went in and out of 
tenants’ bank accounts on the same day, meaning they never ‘saw’ or ‘noticed’ their DPs:
Money goes in, money goes out. I leave it. I forget about it. It [DP] just doesn’t afect me. I’ve 
got the account and money goes in, money goes out. I don’t really think about rent cos the 
money’s nothing to do with me.
7. Impact of DP on landlords
7.1. Increased arrears
DP in the DPDP had a signiicant (negative) efect on landlords’ arrears and a total of £1.9 m 
of rent owed was not paid over the 18-month period, which was equivalent to 2.3 per cent 
of their annual rent roll. Overall, tenants who went onto DP paid 95.5 per cent of all the 
rent owed, compared with the comparator sample who paid 99.1 per cent of rent owed (a 
diference of 3.6 percentage points).
Much of the arrears occurred as tenants transitioned onto DP: 48 per cent accrued at a 
tenant’s irst payment and 65 per cent in the irst three payment periods. his is relected 
in the pronounced spike in payment rates highlighted in Figure 1, which presents rebased 
payment data, i.e. data that have been reconigured so that tenants’ DP journeys begin at 
the same point: their irst payment period.
Figure 1 presents average rent payment rates for each payment period (including the six 
payment periods prior to tenants receiving their irst DP). It shows that, following a sharp 
reduction in payment rates in period 1 (to 67p per £1 of rent), they increased in periods 2 
and 3 but remained below baseline and comparator levels. Ater period 3, payment rates 
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were typically between 1 and 5 pence less rent paid per £1 of rent charged than the com-
parator sample.
his is a really important inding as it suggests that targeting resource at the transition 
to DP will not ‘solve’ the problem of higher arrears. Payment behaviour luctuated and was 
unpredictable (relecting the nature of triggers), with tenants moving between underpay-
ment, non-payment and full payment (and sometimes overpayment) over time.
he prevalence of trigger-prompted underpayment is perhaps not surprising when one 
considers that the economically rationale course of action for tenants (with no or little 
arrears) to take in the case of a inancial emergency is to not pay all or some of their rent. 
his is because, in stark contrast to the exorbitant rates charged by many national money 
lenders and local pay day lenders, interest is not charged on rent arrears. And because arrears 
may be repaid over a relatively long time period, tenants enjoy a negative real interest rate.
When tenants on DP underpaid their rent, they did so by a larger amount than under 
landlord payment. Before the introduction of DP, very few tenants failed to pay more than 
50 per cent of their rent. On average, 10 per cent of all tenants who accrued arrears in the 
few months leading up to the DPDP failed to pay 50–100 per cent of their rent, with the 
remainder underpaying by less than 50 per cent. In the 18 months duration of the DPDP, 
the proportion of under-payers failing to pay 50–100 per cent of their rent rose to 39 per 
cent. DP, then, increased the average size of arrears.
7.2. Increased delivery and management costs
here were other costs associated with DP. Although Demonstration Projects landlords did 
not record the costs associated with delivering DP, there was a consensus amongst them 
that it was more resource intensive than landlord payment. For example, one landlord 
noted that it had to devote three times more resource than ‘normal’ to secure a payment 
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Figure 1. Payment rates: rebased. Base: all tenants; dPdP (7216); comparator (4908). source: Rent Account 
Analysis.
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under DP: ‘So on average we’re putting three times the work in to get the same debit that 
we used to have before’.
Landlords identiied a number of areas where the delivery and management of DP had 
resulted in the use of additional resource and increased costs. Staf time was identiied as 
being the largest one. All project areas appointed a dedicated DPDP project manager and 
in most areas this represented additional staing, and several employed additional housing/
tenancy support workers when it became clear that there was insuicient capacity within 
existing teams.
Some of the staf costs associated with DP were indirect, i.e. accrued by staf not working 
directly on the project. As one Finance Director explained: ‘here’s a myriad of other teams 
who will have invested a lot of time [on DP] and capacity which will have been indirect 
and hidden’.
he cost of upgrading and improving rent collection and recovery IT systems for DP was 
another cost identiied by landlords. Some purchased new sotware because their existing 
IT systems were not compatible with DP, with a common ‘gripe’ being that they could not 
provide the ‘live’, current data that it demanded. New sotware packages could be relatively 
expensive. One landlord, for example, reported spending £50,000 on purchasing one: ‘Our 
biggest challenge is our IT system … we were having to do so many things manually … so 
we invested £50,000 in xxx [rent collection sotware package]’.
he cost of communicating with tenants was another additional cost identiied by land-
lords. here were (non-staf) resource implications for all four of the most commonly used 
communication methods used by landlords: letter writing; telephoning; face-to-face visits; 
and SMS messaging, which they found to be particularly efective.
Finally, payment transaction costs emerged as being another cost. Because more tenants 
were paying their rent, transaction costs increased. However, there is another reason behind 
this increase: the fees charged by pre-payment card providers. As one housing oicer noted:
Our transaction costs have gone up because we have to pay a fee every time a tenant pays 
their rent using a pre-payment card … and there’s a ceiling of £150 … they pay 40 pence per 
transaction … it’s costing us a lot of money …  we worked out that it is costing us £440 in 
additional costs for our tenants.
7.3. Behaviour change
As noted earlier, one of the rationales for the introduction of DP was securing behaviour 
change. While the government had tenants in mind, the greatest behaviour change was 
exhibited by landlords, not tenants. he introduction of DP in the DPDP prompted organ-
isational and cultural change.
Firstly, DP prompted landlords to consider new ways of working. Income teams were 
reconigured, new rent collection methods developed and trialled (SMS reminders, for 
example), oicer working ‘patch’ sizes reconigured and IT systems re-evaluated and 
upgraded. DP necessitated changes in staf roles and responsibilities, and altered the expec-
tations placed upon them. Income oicers in some areas, for example, provided support 
and advice to tenants when this was previously absent from, or a marginal component 
of, their job. here was increased attention and scrutiny from Chief Executive Oicers, 
Boards of directors, members and councillors because of the potential consequences of 
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DP for landlord income streams – pressure which bore down more directly on staf than 
was previously the case.
Secondly, DP resulted in cultural change amongst housing associations participating in 
the DPDP programme. A key driver of this was the need to reconcile the tension between 
their traditional ‘social’ landlord function and the need to adopt a more hard-headed com-
mercial approach in order to protect income streams. As a housing oicer explained:
Landlords are going to have to have a good look in the mirror … we’re going to have a good 
think about the way we operate … we may be forced to act more commercially … and we may 
have to tell tenants: ‘you either pay up or you go’ … we don’t want to do this but this is some-
thing that we are having to give a lot of thought to.
Another cultural change was that the introduction of DP prompted landlords to ind out 
more about their tenants and establish closer relationships with them. When the programme 
was launched, there was a widely held view amongst participating landlords that they ‘knew’ 
their tenants well. However, it soon became apparent that this was not the case: in order to 
prepare for, and implement DP, participating landlords had to develop relationships with 
tenants with whom they previously had little contact. hey had to improve their knowledge 
and understanding of tenants, for example, so they could be adequately supported, their 
readiness for DP assessed, early interventions developed and efective collection methods 
employed. hey saw this as a positive, if unintended, consequence of DP for landlords.
8. Spatial diferences
Given the diversity of both the project areas and participating landlords, it is perhaps sur-
prising that the experience of landlords participating in the DPDP was remarkably similar. 
For example, all landlords reported that DP had had an efect on their rental income, and 
all witnessed the same arrears trajectory: a sharp drop in overall rent payment/collection 
rates when tenants irst transferred to DP, followed by a dramatic improvement over time. 
However, the precise scale, pattern and nature of the increases in arrears difered across 
areas. his pattern was repeated for the other impacts of DP, which oten played out dif-
ferently across the areas. his was because the context within which DP was implemented 
difered markedly across them. A number of contextual factors appeared to inluence how 
the impacts of DP played out in areas, and these could be bundled into four groups: the 
socio-political, legal, cultural and housing policy and practice contexts; place-based factors; 
organisational factors; and the characteristics of tenants.
he difering socio-political, legal, cultural and housing contexts across England, Scotland 
and Wales within which landlords operated impacted on their approach to DP and how it 
played out across the areas. he Scottish landlord noted that it operated under a diferent 
political and legal system than its English and Welsh counterparts: ‘We’ve got our own 
devolved authority and our housing legislation is quite distinct from what you have down 
south’. It also operated in a cultural and political context where evicting tenants was highly 
problematic and an option it was very reluctant to take. his, understandably, impacted on 
how it managed tenants who fell into arrears under DP.
However, there was also marked diferences in relation to the broader context within 
which English landlords operated. For example, again with reference to evictions, an English-
based landlord noted that across the region where it operated (the Midlands) judges held 
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difering viewpoints on when eviction was appropriate, therefore inluencing the approach 
taken by it and other landlords to dealing with tenants who had fallen into arrears:
here’s a real geography on that [judges approaches to evictions]. You speak to people in 
Birmingham: [they say] you wouldn’t go to court for arrears of less than £1,000. hey’d chuck 
you out of the court and you’re not likely to get a possession order, two or three grand is the 
minimum. It’s a diferent world here at the moment and our tenants know.
9. Conclusion
As part of an agenda to ‘responsibilise’ welfare recipients, Conservative-led governments 
in the UK since 2010 have introduced a series of welfare reforms. he most important of 
these is UC. A key feature of UC is a change in the way HB is administered: under UC, 
HB is paid directly to tenants instead of their landlords. his represents a step change for 
them because, for more than three decades, landlord payment has been the norm for social 
housing tenants.
DP was not introduced because there was compelling evidence demanding its implemen-
tation. It was introduced because the UK government believed that DP would responsibilise 
tenants, making them better at money management and thereby better placed to ind work. 
Drawing on data from the oicial evaluation of the pilot designed to test DP – the DPDP 
– this paper has assessed whether this was the case and also examined its broader impact 
on tenants and landlords.
he paper has contributed to knowledge in a number of ways. First, it has added to our 
understanding of DP in the context of social housing, an aspect which (not unexpectedly, 
given the hegemony of landlord payment in the UK) has been under-researched. Second, 
it has highlighted the impact of DP on tenants and, in doing so, built on the work of Irvine 
et al. (2007). Many tenants in their qualitative study believed they would be able to man-
age on DP if it was to be introduced. However, the DPDP study suggests that, in practice, 
only a small proportion of tenants were able to manage. Indeed, only 8 per cent of DPDP 
participants were able to successfully pay all of their rent over the 18-month duration of 
the programme.
he research revealed that the ability to cope with DP was not related to tenants’ demo-
graphic characteristics, although in line with the study by Irvine et al. (2007), it found that 
rent arrears were statistically related to self-reported money management methods. All 
demographic groups found it diicult to cope with DP with their inancial circumstances 
appearing to be the key determinant of how well they fared on DP – the incidence of new 
rent arrears in the DPDP was signiicantly correlated with the inancial circumstances of 
tenants. Arrears were oten triggered by an unexpected event or by a welfare beneit cut 
(the ‘bedroom tax’ or the total Beneit Cap). Unexpected events fell into two categories: 
day-to-day events, such as a washing machine breaking down; and life events like divorce 
and separation or bereavement.
he research found some evidence that administering HB by DP could responsibilise ten-
ants: some tenants reported that being on DP had made them better at money management 
and more likely to look for work, and the proportion of DPDP tenants in work increased 
slightly over the duration of the programme. However, these efects may be temporary 
and we do not know whether DP per se was responsible for the increase in employment 
amongst tenants.
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hird, the paper has contributed to knowledge by highlighting the impact of DP on 
landlords, an issue which to date only two studies have addressed (Donaldson, 2004; Green 
et al., 2015). his study found that DP had a number of negative consequences for them, 
including increased arrears and rent collection costs.
DP prompted behavioural change amongst landlords. It prompted them to review or 
change their organisational structure and practices. And driven by concerns about the 
impact of DP on their inancial circumstances, some housing associations also began to 
review their modus operandi and debated whether to reposition themselves as housing 
providers, with a greater commercial focus and remit, and to become less socially oriented. 
In these cases, therefore, the introduction of DP seemed likely to afect their social orien-
tation and even their culture.
In terms of future research, it is imperative that it is undertaken into the impact of DP 
under UC because the negative efects associated with it will play-out on a much larger scale, 
i.e. nationally – DPDP was a relatively small, geographically constrained, initiative which 
afected relatively few tenants. Furthermore, they are likely to be greater in their magnitude 
and severity. his is because the conditions under which DP is being implemented under 
UC are less favourable than those that existed under DPDP.
For example, under the latter programme, a common budgeting strategy employed by 
those tenants on multiple beneits was to assign beneit income to speciic expenditure 
(the ‘jam jar’ approach), juggling payments and income through the month (for example, 
‘borrowing’ from the HB for food but repaying the following week with the Child Beneit). 
However, this will not be possible under UC.
he way DP is administered also difers between the two initiatives. Under the 
Demonstration Projects programme, the administration of HB remained the responsibil-
ity of local authorities and data sharing between them and landlords was commonplace, 
a practice which was seen by landlords as being a key factor in helping minimise the risks 
associated with DP. his arrangement will not exist under UC, where responsibility for 
administering DP will lie with DWP.
Another diference is the level of resources available to landlords to manage and deliver 
DP, which is likely to be considerably less under UC than was the case under DPDP. his is 
because under the latter programme, landlords were able to target resource on DP tenants, 
who, for many landlords, represented a relatively small proportion of their tenants, and 
were recompensed by DWP for the additional costs associated with delivering DP. Finally, 
and linked to this, under the DPDP programme, landlords were recompensed by DWP for 
rental income lost as a result of DP: this will not occur under UC.
In conclusion, this study has found that shiting from landlord to tenant payment in social 
housing is not simply a change in the way HB is paid. It found that it also had important 
inancial and behavioural consequences for both landlords and tenants. In order to min-
imise the loss of rental income, social housing landlords made numerous compensating 
adjustments to their everyday practices in revenue collection, arrears recovery and housing 
management. Some even changed their organisational structure and considered shiting 
towards a more commercial and less ‘social’ orientation. For tenants, many of whom were 
already struggling inancially (Kemp, 2014), the introduction of DP acted as a trigger that 
pushed them (further) into debt. And although some tenants felt that DP enabled them to 
be better money managers or more job-ready, the harsh reality is that only a small minority 
managed to pay all of their rent during the life of the demonstration project. In other words, 
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the shit to DP of HB was not simply a narrow or ‘boring’ technical matter. On the contrary, 
it was a highly controversial and even emotionally charged reform that had profound con-
sequences for the inancial well-being of many low-income social housing tenants.
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